Historical analysis of U.S. electricity markets: Reassessing carbon lock-in by Carley, Sanya
Historical analysis of U.S. electricity markets: Reassessing carbon lock-in 
 
Sanya Carley a, * 
 
a. School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University, Bloomington, 
Indiana. 
 
* Corresponding author: School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University, 
1315 East Tenth St., Bloomington, Indiana; sanya.carley@gmail.com; 919-265-4651. 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper evaluates whether the U.S. electricity sector is directed away from carbon-
intensive technological lock-in, and which factors are contributing, or have potential to 
contribute, to a possible reorientation of the industry. With the application of a historical 
analysis of the electricity sector from the late nineteenth century through current day, this 
analysis finds that, although the industry still relies primarily on carbon-intensive fossil 
fuel operations, several recent trends indicate that the industry is becoming less carbon 
intensive, smaller in generation system scale, and more sustainable in operations. Crucial 
drivers—firm level interactions with technological change, industry leadership and 
market structure, government intervention and policy momentum, and citizen 
involvement and behavior patterns—that have traditionally shaped the structure, scale, 
and environmental footprint of the industry, have also played a prominent role in recent 
transformations. These results indicate that triggering or extraordinary events may not be 
necessary to initiate an escape from carbon lock-in in the electricity sector. Complete 
escape is not yet definitive, however, and it remains to be seen whether the industry is 
able to transform entirely before any significant climate change disturbances occur. 
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1. Introduction 
The electricity market is changing and evolving, many claim, into one that will 
increasingly rely on sustainable fuel blends and smaller-scale operations (see, for 
instance, Budhraja, 1999; Flavin and Lenssen, 1994; Lasseter, 2006; Lovins, 2002; Li, 
2004; Geller, 2003; Alanne and Saari, 2006; Abulfotuh, 2007). Developments in state and 
local policies to support renewable energy deployment and distributed generation may be 
identified as a harbinger of changes to come, an indication that the U.S. is ready to pursue 
a more sustainable electricity future. Yet, in contrast to these accounts, Unruh (2000) and 
others identify the sector’s resistance to change, and its inability to break from a path-
dependency based on fossil fuel and carbon-intensive operations in the generation and 
consumption of energy. 
Is the U.S. electricity sector indeed on a path, as some have predicted, toward a 
lower carbon electricity future? Furthermore, if the sector is diverging from its path 
dependency, which primary factors are driving these trends? This paper explores these 
questions with the use of a historical analysis in effort to dissect the major developments 
in the sector’s history that have contributed to its heavy reliance on carbon-intensive 
operations, and to assess whether, in light of this history and current developments, the 
electric industry is able, or on route, to escaping carbon lock-in. 
The outline for this study is as follows. I begin with a review of Unruh’s theory of 
“carbon lock-in” in section 2. In section 3, I present the methodological approach; in 
section 4, the history of the U.S. electricity sector as it relates to these issues; and, in 
section 5, a review of the primary factors that have contributed significantly to carbon 
lock-in. I analyze modern day electricity operations in section 6 to detect trends related to 
carbon lock-in, or an escape from lock-in, and conclude in the last section. 
 
2. Understanding and Escaping Carbon Lock-in 
In “Understanding carbon lock-in,” published in Energy Policy in 2000, Gregory 
Unruh presents the theory of carbon lock-in, the condition in which technological 
advancements, due to scale and learning economies, and institutional forces—including 
social, firm, and public institution responses—become co-evolutionary and inter-
dependent. The combination of these forces can become self-perpetuating, and 
continually feedback to reinforce the system, a process that Unruh terms the “techno-
institutional complex” (or TIC), and can thus result in path-dependency. Over time, this 
path dependency generally forms an equilibrium state, or a quasi-equilibrium, in which 
alternative technological and institutional change happens incrementally, if at all (i.e., 
“lock-out”). In the case of energy technologies, which are the focus on Unruh’s theory, 
TICs create “persistent market and policy failures that can inhibit the diffusion of carbon-
saving technologies despite their apparent environmental and economic advantages” 
(817). 
Unruh relates his theory to several aspects of U.S. energy markets, including the 
transportation, telecommunications, and electricity sectors. In illustration of the TIC 
concept as it applies to the electricity sector, Unruh provides a diagram, which is 
replicated and modified in Figure 1 below. This diagram, which is a simplified 
representation of electricity sector institutions and components, demonstrates the inter-
dependencies that can, over time, establish path-dependency on carbon-intensive 
electricity generation and consumption. The lock-in cycle according to Unruh involves 
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four main components: markets, firms, government, and consumers. Each of these 
components has its own internal cycle, which shapes the nature and progress of the entire 
system’s feedback processes. 
 
Figure 1. Modified Depiction of Unruh’s (2000) Electricity Sector  
Techno-Institutional Complex 
 
 
In a later analysis, Unruh (2002) poses the question of how to escape carbon lock-
in? Unruh argues that there are generally three policy approaches to overcoming 
environmental dis-utilities of technological systems: (1) only treat the emissions but not 
the greater system; (2) treat components of the process but maintain the overall “system 
architecture”; or (3) treat the entire system architecture (Unruh, 2002: 318). These three 
options, respectively, are summarized as end-of-pipe, continuity, and discontinuity. The 
feasibility of each of these options, however, is constrained by the boundaries of the 
current TIC, as Unruh explains, “When system growth and permanence has become 
institutionalized, as in the case of several fossil fuel based systems, some options can 
only be explored once the lock-in condition is overcome” (2002: 320). What, then, does it 
take to overcome lock-in so that energy policymakers and other actors can pursue one of 
these policy approaches? Toward these ends, Unruh posits that there are three possible 
mechanisms: incremental policy shifts away from the carbon lock-in equilibrium through 
the use of basic policy instruments; or an expansion or diffusion of information to 
facilitate awareness of the problems associated with carbon lock-in. What Unruh explains 
to be the most likely scenario, however, is that policymakers will have to wait for a 
“triggering” or “focusing” event to precipitate action and institutional change that is 
counter to a carbon lock-in equilibrium. In keeping with others’ theories, large-scale 
institutional policy change often requires external shocks (March and Olsen, 1989; North, 
1990) or “extraordinary events” (Cowan and Hulten, 1996). Unruh acknowledges, 
however, that “[d]espite these barriers, technological and institutional changes have 
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occurred repeatedly in history…so readers should not assume that the current quasi-stable 
equilibrium is a permanent feature.” 
The present analysis takes Unruh’s carbon lock-in theory as a starting place for 
analysis, with the following two-part research question: is the U.S. electricity sector on 
the path to escaping carbon lock-in; and which factors are contributing, or have potential 
to contribute, to a possible “escape” of the sector’s quasi-stable equilibrium? In 
addressing this question, this study also considers whether Unruh’s theory about the need 
for a “triggering” event to precipitate institutional change is valid in the case of the 
electricity sector. Or, alternatively, might it be possible that institutional changes can 
occur through the same processes that first established the equilibrium in the first place? 
Might the positive feedbacks that created the techno-institutional complex, based on 
carbon-intensive production and consumption of U.S. electricity, be equally able to 
reverse, or escape, lock-in? 
 
3. Methodological Approach 
The methodological approach employed in the present study is a historical 
analysis. The objective is to dissect major events and trends throughout the history of the 
U.S. electricity sector, and identify factors that have contributed to carbon lock-in and the 
quasi-equilibrium state of the electricity sector as it remained through the end of the 
twentieth century. Specifically, I identify trends at the market, firm, consumer, and 
government levels that have contributed to the techno-institutional complex that shapes 
Unruh’s carbon lock-in theory. Following the historic account of lock-in, I analyze more 
recent trends in the sector to extract insights on potential future directions in which the 
sector may head, and to use this information to assess whether the sector is on route to 
escaping carbon lock-in. 
The data and information gathered and synthesized for this analysis are secondary 
in nature, that is, historical studies that have been conducted already on electricity sector 
trends and formative events. I compile the historical assessments that shape this discourse 
via a literature review of relevant books, articles, and grey literature in the energy field, 
with efforts extended to collect a variety of perspectives and accounts. Secondary data are 
primary sourced from the Energy Information Administration, but include several other 
sources as well; all data used to support the arguments made in this paper are cited 
accordingly. 
There are multiple advantages to this type of methodological approach. First, a 
historical analysis allows one to get a sense of changes over time, how transitions, major 
events, or key elements have shaped the sector in the past, and what kind of potential 
these same elements have to shape the market in the future. Second, this type of analysis 
allows one to consider all trends in the electricity sector, not just those that are 
specifically related to carbon policies, or could be easily summarized as a quantitative 
variable and inserted into an empirical model. Third, a historical analysis provides a 
greater context for understanding the phenomenon of carbon lock-in that is more rich and 
detailed than alternative research design approaches. 
While there are several advantages to this type of analysis, it is nonetheless 
important to note that one must remain cautious in the interpretation of the findings and 
conclusions. A historical analysis can make no claims of causality, and is not capable of 
asserting information regarding the strength of associations between and among events, 
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or between events and other factors. Also, as discussed above, the present analysis relies 
extensively on others’ accounts of the historical foundations of the U.S. electricity sector, 
since no primary data or information was gathered in the preparation of this study; and 
the secondary nature of this compiled information may restrict or at least formatively 
shape the conclusions drawn in this paper. Proceeding with these precautions, I turn in 
the next section to a review of the history of the electricity sector, focusing in particular 
on the events and trends that have led to carbon lock-in of the sector. 
 
4. History of the Electricity Industry 
4.1 Nineteenth Century Electricity: the Early Rise and Fall of Distributed Energy  
Prior to the 1880s, gas technologies were the most advanced lighting options in 
the United States; heat was provided by direct local combustion of wood or coal, and 
mechanical energy was provided largely by steam engines, watermills, and animal 
traction. Thomas Edison, working throughout the 1870s on the telegraph, the telephone, 
and the phonograph, soon thereafter produced direct current (DC) electricity to replace 
gas lighting with more efficient electric lighting (Hirsh, 1999). Generated at a small 
central station facility in lower Manhattan beginning in 1882, Edison’s operation 
employed steam engines and generators and was linked to a wiring network that could 
transmit DC electricity for up to one mile. The first establishments to have electricity 
were hotels, opera houses, department stores, and theaters (Smeloff and Asmus, 1997); 
and eventually local governments purchased electricity to power public spaces, such as 
for street lighting (Patterson, 1999). Electricity was more expensive than gas lighting; 
only those private or public interests that were willing to pay the premium purchased 
electricity.  
Within a couple of years of Edison’s invention, however, the DC electricity model 
was challenged by Westinghouse and Nikola Tesla’s alternative current (AC) design, 
which could transmit electricity in both directions within a circuit and over a significantly 
greater distance than DC’s mono-directional current. The “battle of the systems,” pitted 
Edison, advocate of DC, against Westinghouse and Tesla, advocates of AC. Edison 
eventually lost (Patterson, 1999). 
By the 1890s, AC current became the predominant model of electricity 
transmission and, by 1893, AC-DC converters and transformers technologically 
completed the universal electricity system. With the advent of this new model and the 
concurrent invention of the steam turbine by Charles Parsons, electricity prices became 
more reasonable and operations expanded to meet the needs of new customers and new 
sectors of the market.  
The electricity industry did not get fully off the ground, however, until the advent 
of the trolley. It was then, in the 1890s, that electricity operations fully captured a unique 
market that was met by steady demand. In 1895, Sacramento, California deployed the 
first non-distributed AC electrical application in which electricity was transmitted from a 
central source via high voltage lines (Smeloff and Asmus, 1997). On the whole, however, 
power production began small; dispersed generation units located close to the end-user 
were frequently deployed on a residential and industrial scale. The gradual growth of 
private power companies, the evolving sophistication of electricity technologies, and the 
use of larger, more centralized generation facilities for public services eventually led to 
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the replacement of dispersed and distributed generation by large-scale generation 
systems.  
Electricity prices remained fairly low during the late 1800s, mainly due to 
consistent supply-side competition between various electricity technological inventions, 
including electric trams, trolleys, stationary electric motors, and the Welsbach mantle 
(Patterson, 1999), and demand-side competition by a growing base of end-use consumers.  
By the end of the century, the electricity industry in the U.S. was a fully functioning and 
continually expanding market, with individual actors that were rapidly acquiring market 
power.  
The early years of the electric industry laid the foundation for subsequent market 
and firm level dynamics. With the new formation of the electric market, and the 
commercial deployment of various electricity technologies, consumer demand rose as 
consumers began to incorporate electricity into their daily patterns of life. The techno-
institutional cycles, therefore, at the market, firm, and consumer levels began in the 
earliest years of the industry’s foundations. There was still possibility, however, for the 
industry to develop according to any number of different paths; that is, until the 
Progressive era locked in the market structure and the role of the government in oversight 
of the industry and the post-World War II era locked in the industry’s reliance on large-
scale, centralized, fossil fuel generation. 
 
4.2 The Progressive Era: Public vs. Private Power Production 
During the 1890s and early 1900s, private utility companies expanded their 
market power through mergers and financial consolidation. Monopoly expansion was a 
prominent trend of the time and not unique to the electricity sector; although 
monopolistic power had become particularly pronounced in the electric sector. In effort 
to address these market abuses, municipal governments across the country developed 
their own power operations with city-owned plants and network facilities. By 1907 
municipal power companies constituted roughly one-third of the nation’s power suppliers 
(Hirsh, 1999).  
Not all regions, however, responded to market power dynamics with the creation 
of public power entities. Others dealt with these issues via regulation. Samuel Insull, a 
personal secretary of Edison’s, was one of the first advocates of a regulated electric 
industry. Insull, an owner of several utilities including Commonwealth Edison, had 
bought out numerous rivals and consolidated operations under one entity in the early turn 
of the century. Disinclined to regional competition, Insull explained to his businessmen-
peers that a regulated industry would allow utilities to act as natural monopolies, 
unfettered by standard market competition and with additional freedom to pursue 
economies of scale in operations. Insull rallied support from other prominent 
businessmen, such as J.P. Morgan, to lock-in the notion of a regulated industry among the 
private industry leaders, state officials, and the public (Smeloff and Asmus, 1997).  
In response to Insull’s advocacy efforts, local municipalities across the U.S. began 
to grant exclusive charter territories to individual power companies.1 These developments 
                                                 
1 These territory franchises generally involved certain utility obligations, such as universal, non-
discriminatory, and reliable service, and additionally included other regulatory measures to check 
monopolistic abuse (Patterson, 1999).  Regulators set electricity rates under territory franchises to cover 
utility’s operating expenses and provide an additional “just and reasonable” return on their investments. 
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marked the gradual victory of private firms in the industry due to economies of scale, 
business expertise, and political power and influence, and precipitated the movement of 
the market level component of the techno-institutional complex down the path toward 
lock-in. 
While other countries facing electricity market expansion encouraged cooperative 
utilities to generate and distribute public power (Patterson, 1999), the U.S. electricity 
sector became increasingly more privatized and state-regulated. Amidst the Progressive 
movement in the U.S., whose political leaders attempted to condemn political corruption 
and corporate crime, emerged a “regulatory ideology” within Wisconsin and New York 
that encouraged state regulation of the electricity industry and sought to enforce 
governmental control over a complex natural monopoly (Hirsh, 1999). Regulation of the 
industry, in other words, provided security and confirmed market power for utilities that 
otherwise would not be guaranteed under non-regulation.2  
Other states followed Wisconsin and New York’s lead and drafted legislation that 
mandated state regulatory commissions to oversee day-to-day operations within the 
electricity sector, thereby reinforcing the connection between markets and firm level 
developments in the formative years of the techno-institutional complex. The majority of 
state commissions’ regulatory authorities were granted during the Progressive era, such 
as the responsibility for regulating the retail sale of electricity, as well as the distribution, 
siting, construction, operations, and rate-setting of electricity utilities (Brennan et al., 
2002). Utility commissions were also granted quasi-legislative powers, the authority to 
impose penalties for non-compliance with their rules, and quasi-judicial power (Hirsh, 
1999).  
By the end of World War I, the electricity sector was the biggest industry in the 
country. Electricity companies continued to expand by facilitating mergers and attracting 
significant private investment. Electricity demand grew, particularly in the aftermath of 
World War I, while electricity prices declined simultaneously.  
In 1920 Congress passed the last major federal Progressive-era legislation, the 
Federal Power Act (FPC), which established the Federal Power Commission (now the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, or “FERC”). The Federal Power Act established 
federal control over wholesale electricity operations, interstate gas and oil operations, and 
across-state transmission services, among other responsibilities. This act formally divided 
state and federal authority over operations within the electricity sector (Brennan et al., 
2002).  
In just over three decades, electric power generation evolved from a never-heard-
of technology intended by Edison to power residential lamps into one of the biggest and 
most powerful industries in the country, on par with the railway, water, and telephone 
industries. Progressive era reformers and private capitalists were the most significant 
participants in this transformation. In pursuit of economic development and the 
curtailment of government corruption, policymakers of the Progressive era framed the 
new shape and scope of the electricity market: a state-regulated industry in which large, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Patterson describes the new method of electricity operations: “each system became a local ‘fiefdom,’ 
making its own decisions within its own local framework of laws and regulations and with a distinctive and 
intimate relationship with the relevant government” (1999: 45). 
2 One such power was ability to use eminent domain to secure private lands for public purposes, a privilege 
that had previously been granted only to the government (Hirsh, 1999).   
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independent utility companies owned the majority of the market’s power production 
facilities and sought ever-increasing means of generation and distribution efficiency. The 
structural form of the sector, including the interactions between government, firm, 
consumer, and market levels of the completed techno-institutional complex, has remained 
largely the same until recent decades, when similar questions have resurfaced regarding 
market power, competition and incentives to innovate, public versus private 
responsibilities, and the consumers’ role within the sector.  
 
4.3 The New Deal: National Control and Rural Electrification 
By the early 1930s three holding companies provided the majority of the U.S.’s 
generation capacity (Patterson, 1999). Concerned with the growing, unchecked power of 
the industry and various holding company abuses, President Franklin Roosevelt and 
Progressives in the Congress sought to increase federal oversight of the industry and to 
challenge the private, regulated-utility model of operation. 
Frustrated with overtly profit-seeking utility operations, Roosevelt sought means 
to allocate public power authority to public organizations, which he accomplished via 
rural electrification and large-scale hydroelectricity initiatives. First as governor of New 
York, Roosevelt created the Power Authority of the State of New York, and later as 
President of the United States, Roosevelt developed federal power agencies that mixed 
socio-economic policy with electricity operations. From early in his presidency, 
Roosevelt channeled federal money toward large-scale hydroelectricity, flood control, 
and water management projects. In 1933, Roosevelt founded the Tennessee Valley 
Authority (TVA), which he charged with the mission to provide electrical power to all 
citizens in the Tennessee Valley and surrounding areas. Roosevelt initiated other water 
resource developments as well, including Bonneville Dam, Boulder Canyon Dam, and 
the Grand Coulee Dam, among others. These projects not only provided federal public 
power but they also acted as a “yardstick” against which private prices for electricity 
could be compared to assess whether prices were reasonable (Smeloff and Asmus, 1997). 
In 1935 Congress created the Rural Electrification Administration (REA) as part of the 
Rural Electrification Act, which helped finance cooperative generation and distribution 
companies that served rural farmers and other isolated customers. The REA most notably 
constructed federally financed transmission networks across the Midwest, a result of 
emerged the cooperative utility ownership model (Patterson, 1999). 
In 1935 Congress enacted the Public Utilities Holding Companies Act (PUHCA) 
as a consumer-protection law. PUHCA forced large electric holding companies to divest 
their holdings and also tightened regulation over utilities’ jurisdictions and investment 
procedures. Through PUHCA legislation, the federal government assumed a larger role in 
the regulation of the electricity sector, especially under circumstances in which power 
crossed interstate boundaries (Patterson, 1999). 
The New Deal period contributed to the techno-institutional complex of the U.S. 
electricity sector by further expanding the role of government in the day-to-day 
involvement of the industry’s supply side operations. By the end of this period, the public 
sector controlled a portion of the industry, and established its role as a necessary 
participant to ensure electricity access and affordability to American citizens. 
 
4.4 Post World War II: Reddy Kilowatt and Electricity’s Heyday 
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During and following World War II, the electric sector was marked by 
unprecedented growth and expansion. Fueling this growth, electricity demand steadily 
rose throughout the late 1940s and into the early 1960s—by roughly seven percent per 
year—while a greater number of electronics flooded consumer markets and mainstream 
culture. Electricity companies continued to encourage greater energy consumption; 
concurrently, utility companies sought to transform the consumer image of electricity into 
one based on ease of living and attainment of family-oriented lifestyles. Personifying the 
industry’s services, electricity companies produced ads that featured Reddy Kilowatt, an 
electricity network in the shape of a man, who could guarantee “better living through 
electricity” (Patterson, 1999: 58). Models of “all electric homes” also emerged through 
similar electricity company ad campaigns.  
   In response to rapidly increasing demand for electricity, utility companies grew 
both within and outside of their own businesses. Separate companies formed “power 
pools” as a method of trading electricity capacity back and forth to adequately respond to 
changes in electricity load. Within their own businesses, power companies sought larger 
and more centralized physical plants. Utilities expanded operations and built one after 
another base-load coal power plants. Steam turbine technologies continued to evolve, 
thereby helping large power producers realize greater economies of scale. A variety of 
energy sources continued to experience declining costs as well, including coal, diesel, oil, 
petroleum, and natural gas, although natural gas was not a popular source of supply until 
the late ‘70s. Larger, more centralized power plants became increasingly more efficient, 
while smaller, less efficient units were edged out of the market or held in reserve for 
peaking power. As long as energy demand continued to rise, increasingly larger power 
plants paid off. An average low-cost power plant in the 1970s was 20 times larger than 
one built in the 1930s (Smeloff and Asmus, 1997). The largest electrical generator in 
1903 was a 5 MW unit, transformed into a 200 MW unit by 1930, a 500-1200 MW unit 
by the 1960s, and, finally, a 1400 MW unit by the 1970s (Lovins et al., 2002). 
Concurrent improvements in various transmission and distribution technologies 
allowed central stations to locate further away from the end-use costumer. By the 1970s, 
power plants could be located as far away as 500 km from the end user (Patterson, 1999). 
The most cost-efficient method of producing electricity during the 1950s and 1960s was 
with the largest power plants, delivered via AC distribution networks that spanned the 
greatest distance possible (Patterson, 1999). Economies of scale allowed for cheap 
electricity, which in turn helped fuel economic growth and enhance consumer demand for 
electricity.3  
  By the mid-1960s, however, the growth in thermal efficiency of these power 
plants began to level off, which prompted the industry to turn toward nuclear 
technologies. Heavily endorsed by General Electric and Westinghouse, nuclear energy 
                                                 
3 Municipal utilities and cooperatives, having gained some footing in the industry during the 1930s and 
1940s, eventually found that they had to fight the large, central plant model for any market power. 
Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD), for instance, emerged in 1946 after over two decades of 
citizen and community leaders’ insistence that, according to the Federal Power Act, municipal utilities 
should have a legal priority to build hydroelectric operations (Smeloff and Asmus, 1997). Hydroelectric 
power production increased dramatically through federal subsidies for multi-purpose dam construction in 
the 1950s, but large-scale hydropower development opportunities were largely tapped out by the mid-
1960s. Most public utilities, most notably the TVA, instead followed the private industries’ model: invest 
in large central-station coal and oil power plants (Smeloff and Asmus, 1997). 
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made its debut among civilian electric companies in the early 1960s. The first nuclear 
facility was built by the Jersey Central Power and Light Company, which generated 
electricity at a price that was economically competitive with traditional fossil fuels 
(Smeloff and Asmus, 1997), although this competitiveness was predicated on federal 
subsidies and liability insurance protection under the Price-Anderson Act. By the late 
1960s, nuclear facilities were widely used across the country, owned and operated by 
many public and private electricity companies. 
The post-WWII period of the industry’s history was one of the most significant 
contributors to carbon lock-in. In particular, the post-WWII period was a time of 
substantial electricity infrastructure and market expansion, all components of which 
reinforced the model of large-scale, centralized fossil fuel and continuously increasing in 
capacity size electricity operations, and a firm business model that based profits on 
supply-side expansion. This period also witnessed the expansion of the coal industry in 
the electricity market; coal generation quickly grew in market share, as the coal industry 
entrenched itself near the center of the technical and institutional co-evolution of the 
industry. 
 
4.5 The Industry meets its Biggest Challenges: the Environment, Diseconomies of Scale, 
and Economic Risk 
Toward the end of the 1960s, the industry’s outlook took a notable turn. As a 
result of Johnson’s Great Society programs and the Vietnam War, U.S. inflation began to 
rise. A concurrent increase in interest rates made capital borrowing more expensive and 
the 1973 Arab oil embargo contributed further to rising inflation. Between 1973 and 
1979, the price of oil went from $3 per barrel to $30 per barrel. Inflation and high interest 
rates affected the short-term economic stability of utilities, since many electric utilities 
held a variety of investments in new and existing central-station power plants. These 
economic conditions alone may not have been enough to compromise the industry; but in 
conjunction with the energy crises of 1973 and 1979, and the burgeoning environmental 
movement, the industry faced unprecedented challenges. 
With approval from their respective state regulatory commissions, utilities were 
able to pass the higher costs of investment on to their consumers, who protested the 
higher rates that had as much as doubled in some regions (Patterson, 1999). Citizen 
action groups mobilized in different regions across the country and lobbied for reduced 
rates. Consumers also responded to electricity price increases by reducing their demand 
for electricity, resulting in a drop from an average of 7 percent growth per year to a 2 
percent growth (Patterson, 1999). A reduction in demand reduced significantly the need 
for more power plants, during a time in which hundreds of power plants were being built 
and financed across the country. These planning and investment uncertainties further 
wounded the electricity sector.  
Concurrently, the environmental movement in the U.S. was gaining momentum. 
By the late 1960s, environmental groups had launched a series of campaigns that targeted 
different aspects of the electricity market, including air pollution, waste disposal, 
chemical-use and discharge, nuclear use and disposal, and water pollution. A broad 
coalition of environmental activists continued to push the federal government to regulate 
industries that contributed deleterious effects on human health and safety. 
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In response to public unrest, the federal government became actively involved in 
the electricity industry through direct regulation of the sector’s outputs and standard 
operations. Starting with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), signed into law 
by President Richard Nixon on January 1, 1970, the government established their 
expanded regulatory role within the sector. NEPA created the Council of Environmental 
Quality and mandated the use of environmental impact statements for infrastructure and 
development projects that require government approval or financing. Following NEPA 
were a series of air pollution acts—including the Clean Air Act of 1970 and the 1977 
Clean Air Act—which increased the costs associated fossil fuel operations, particularly in 
the case of coal, and further increased the cost of electricity. The Department of Energy 
(DOE) was also created in the late 1970s, charged with a mission to oversee energy 
security, research and development initiatives, and energy supply issues. These 
developments represented the first federal attempts to incorporate environmental 
considerations into electricity policymaking and regulatory oversight. 
Federal presence increased in the sector, as did state and utility commission 
oversight. This combination of a multi-level government presence altered the power 
dynamics within the industry, as Hirsh explains: “utility managers felt constrained by the 
growing web of environmental legislation and regulation, and they effectively lost their 
former ability to make almost unilateral decisions regarding the location, design, and 
construction of power plants” (1999: 69). 
Following the first energy crisis and the rapid evolution of the environmental 
movement, President Jimmy Carter launched one of the largest energy campaigns the 
U.S. had experienced since the 1930s. Influenced by works of E. F. Schumacher and 
Amory Lovins4, Carter’s energy initiatives focused primarily on diversifying fuel sources 
and reducing consumer demand. After assuming office in 1977, Carter championed the 
Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Act and the Natural Gas Policy Act, which sought to 
prohibit the use of oil and natural gas in new power plants and to deregulate the price of 
newly discovered natural gas, respectively. Carter then signed the Public Utility 
Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) as part of the National Energy Act of 1978.  
In Section 210 of PURPA, utilities were required to connect qualifying facilities 
(QF)—small generators using non-fossil fuel energy sources and cogenerators—to the 
transmission grid.5 Under PURPA, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission was 
granted the authority to decide whether a QF is held to the same regulations—including 
utility rate structuring, financial obligations, and organizational structure—as traditional 
utilities (Hirsh, 1999). The actual implementation of PURPA, however, was left up to 
                                                 
4 E.F. Schumacher’s Small is Beautiful, written in 1973, emphasized the importance of developing 
energy infrastructure within the scale of actual need. Following Schumacher’s publication, Amory Lovin’s 
“Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken” was published in Foreign Affairs in 1976, which advocated for a 
departure from traditional large-scale power production, toward a “soft energy path” based on renewable 
energy, energy efficiency, and a different scale and quality of production (Lovins, 1976). Lovins discussed 
how rate-payer resistance to raising rates would prevent utilities from building more centralized power 
plants; a solution to this supply-demand disconnect, Lovins explained, would require the U.S. to pursue a 
soft-energy path based on a “least-cost approach” to electricity generation that supports more distributed 
sources and a greater role for efficiency.  
 
5 PURPA required that utilities purchase power from QFs at a price not to exceed the “avoided costs” of the 
power that would be produced in the qualifying facility’s absence. 
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state regulators. The passage of PURPA thereby transformed utility commissioners’ roles 
within state electricity markets, granting them greater discretion in market decisions and 
power dynamics (Hirsh, 1999).6  
The most immediate effect of PURPA was the industry’s new promotion of the jet 
engine, otherwise known as the combustion turbine. Combustion turbines, when used in 
cogeneration plants, are exceedingly more efficient than traditional turbine technologies; 
more than 75 percent of the energy potential of natural gas can be captured with 
cogeneration combustion turbines (Smeloff and Asmus, 1997). Cogeneration plants, 
however, are relatively small in size compared to traditional power plants. Largely as a 
result of PURPA, the amount of cogeneration capacity in the U.S. increased four-fold in 
the decade and half following its passage (Hirsh, 1999). PURPA additionally gave rise to 
wind and industrial steam technologies, promoted the re-entry of small hydro dams, and 
encouraged research and development efforts in other technologies, such as the fuel cell, 
solar troughs, and fluidized bed combustion boilers (Hirsh, 1999).  
PURPA’s Section 210 also encouraged industrial and personal applications of 
small-scale generation facilities. Industrial leaders and independent power producers, as a 
result of PURPA, began to locate small electricity modules next to the actual load 
demands, which marked a divergence from the industry’s predominant model of large, 
centrally located power plants.  
  Additionally, PURPA reduced barriers to entry in the electricity generation 
market and was the first flavor of deregulation that the electricity sector had experienced. 
Independent power producers, for instance, were granted access to retail markets under 
PURPA stipulations and were not necessarily required to charge traditional rate-based 
prices for electricity. Hirsh (1999) provides an analysis of PURPA’s effects on the 
electricity sector. In his analysis, Hirsh explains that PURPA contributed to the 
“disintegration” of the “traditional structure of utility systems” by reducing barriers to 
entry within the generation sector, introducing free-market principles, and changing 
power demographics within the industry (119).  
The enactment of PURPA, and the subsequent changes in electric sector 
operations that ensued as a result of its passage, represented both a continuation of the 
path dependency of the industry as well as a divergence, or threat, to the industry’s quasi-
equilibrium state. In continuation of the pre-established path dependency, PURPA 
reinforced the use of fossil fuels as the primary source of energy supply. In divergence of 
this path, PURPA encouraged the deployment of new supply-side technologies, including 
various renewable resources; led to an increase in the use of smaller-scale generation 
units; and affected the number and types of market actors within the industry. It was not 
yet clear at this time, however, which PURPA trends would prevail and whether the new 
threats to the industry’s equilibrium would gain enough momentum to challenge the 
stability of the techno-institutional complex. 
 
                                                 
6 Although PURPA is best known for mandating QF access to the grid, this was not its primary objective. 
PURPA was largely intended to encourage state utility regulatory bodies to consider load management 
options and retail price structuring that would encourage efficiency and conservation measures; as a result, 
many utility commissions across the country mandated that utilities implement conservation programs 
before building new power plants.  
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4.6 1980s: A Decade of Demand-side Exploration 
By the late 1970s and early 1980s, the central-station model of electricity 
operations was under heavy scrutiny. Oil prices were found to fluctuate drastically; coal 
operations contributed to environmental problems; and nuclear energy was increasingly 
the focus of citizen protests. The Three Mile Island nuclear accident in 1979 completed 
the shift in the public’s perception of nuclear energy. Before Three Mile Island, nuclear 
energy was less efficient and more difficult to site than other traditional fuel sources but 
produced electricity at a relatively low cost. Following the nuclear scare at Three Mile 
Island, as well as the fire at TVA’s Brown’s Ferry, nuclear energy became a risky 
investment and exceedingly unpopular in the public’s eye. As a consequence, nuclear 
sites were no longer developed after the 1970s in the United States.  
Between 1984 and 1987, oil prices began to fall again. Natural gas became a 
leading energy source and combined cycle technologies using natural gas became widely 
deployed. The building of coal and nuclear facilities slowed down dramatically, from an 
average of 268 plants per year since the 1940s to a total of 22 plants throughout all of the 
1990s (Lovins et al., 2002). Combined cycle and natural gas plants began supplanting 
traditional coal and nuclear facilities. Meanwhile, independent producers entered the 
market to develop cogeneration and renewable energy systems. These trends 
demonstrated a new form of economies of scale in the electricity sector: economies from 
the manufacturing of generation units (Patterson, 1999; Hirsh, 1999).  
Also in the 1980s, some state public service commissions began to require that 
utilities adopt integrated resource planning (IRP) programs that relied on demand side 
management (DSM) energy conservation techniques. DSM actually began in the 1970s, 
following the oil crisis, when utilities offered educational information to consumers about 
electricity conservation techniques via energy audits, printed materials, and personal 
communication (Nadel and Geller, 1996). As DSM programs evolved and became more 
elaborate, the obligations—both financial and consumer-service—assigned to utilities 
also became more extensive. By the late 1980s, when oil and gas prices fell and the 
perceived risk of limited energy supplies fizzled out, many utilities grew reluctant to 
promote DSM programs (Patterson, 1999). Utilities also demonstrated reluctance because 
they has overbuilt electric generating capacity in the 1970s and, given the slower rate of 
demand growth in the 1980s, they had less incentive to continue promoting demand 
reduction. Both DSM and IRP programs offered a disincentive to utilities: discouraging 
consumption only reduces profits. Utility resistance and the general recognition of this 
disincentive led to lengthy, multi-actor discussions in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
about how to create more innovative DSM programs. These discussions resulted in new 
DSM programs that provided direct financial incentives for conservation, and also made 
state commissions directly responsible for environmental management (Hirsh, 1999). 
Utilities’ resistance to DSM and IRP programs, however, continued into the 1990s and 
helped fuel discussions regarding market power and the possible need for market 
liberalization (Hirsh, 1999).  
By the end of the 1980s, the techno-institutional complex of the electric sector 
still maintained carbon lock-in. At the firm level, the majority of electric businesses 
continued to invest primarily in fossil fuel technologies. At the market level, although the 
scale of some operations was decreasing, the market tended to favor centralized 
operations, and the transmission and distribution infrastructure that supported this scale 
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of operations. At the consumer level, the electric industry witnessed a rebound in electric 
demand post-1970s, when energy prices began to fall again. At the government level, 
although policies and regulations enacted during the 1970s and 1980s sought to improve 
the environmental performance of electricity systems and operations, the effect of the 
various policies enacted by the end of the 1980s was not substantial enough to alter the 
institutional and technical feedbacks at the firm, market, or consumer levels; nor were 
these policies able to alter significantly the costs of fossil fuel-based electric generation 
so as to represent the full social costs of fuel extraction, production, and distribution. 
These combined forces, therefore, continued to perpetuate carbon-intensive operations 
within the industry. At the same time, however, the electric industry was evolving and 
changing in several other regards, including the influx of new market participants, the 
increase in investment of less carbon-intensive new energy supplies, and the increase in 
regulation oriented toward environmental and market structure considerations. Although 
these changes did not threaten the quasi-equilibrium state of the industry, these ongoing 
developments in scale, scope, and institutional make-up prompted discussions among 
industry leaders and policymakers regarding the economic composition of the industry at 
large, and eventually led to new rules and regulations aimed at opening portions of 
electric sector to competition.  
 
4.7 The 1990s: A Time of Restructuring 
The Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct) and FERC’s Orders 888 and 889 helped 
“extend PURPA’s open-access policies to all generators” (Brennen et al., 2002: 105) and 
facilitated a growing base of market actors, particularly in wholesale power markets. 
EPAct established exempt wholesale generators (EWS), which are electric generators that 
can be owned by a utility, a company that is independent of utilities, or by a holding 
company. Orders 888 and 889, established in 1996 to initiate EPAct stipulations, required 
that all utility companies provide nondiscriminatory transmission access to any 
generation company. In the case that there is not enough transmission capacity for a 
generator to plug into the grid, Order 888 required utilities to expand capacity to allow 
these generators access. Order 888 also allowed independent system operators to manage 
transmission lines and ensured nondiscriminatory access to unaffiliated generation 
companies. Utilities were required to “unbundle” their transmission, ancillary services, 
and generation rates; and as established in FERC Order 889, utilities were required to 
provide information on the ongoing prices of each of these services. FERC’s Order 2000, 
following Orders 888 and 889 and issued in 1999, mandated that power companies 
commit all transmission assets to a regional transmission operator or explain why they 
are not doing so (Brennan et al., 2002). 
The aforementioned events of the 1970s spurred discussion of market power and 
competition within the industry and eventually led to more complex discussions, 
beginning around 1992, of market structure and the potential for restructuring. 
Discussions focused on whether competition in the industry could improve efficiencies in 
supply-side costs; whether restructuring could effectively balance and reduce electricity 
rates in different states; and whether restructuring would encourage innovation and allow 
advanced supply-side technologies to capture a greater share of the market (EIA, 2000; 
Joskow, 2008). By 1994 these discussions became widespread and involved a mix of 
industry leaders, state and federal utility organizations, and third-party actors. 
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Policymakers across the country began to draft laws and policies that aimed to disband 
the traditional monopoly structure and increase competition in electricity markets. In 
early 1994 California created a restructuring Blue Book proposal for their retail 
electricity market. California enacted their restructuring plan in August 1996; within six 
months, three other states also enacted restructuring plans to make retail electricity 
markets competitive (Hirsh, 1999).7  
The effects of deregulation have been varied. Since the late 1990s, almost half of 
the states have adopted some form of restructuring. Although one of the main goals of 
restructuring is to reduce the cost of electricity, deregulation has resulted in unusually 
high prices and rolling blackouts in some states. Other states, such as Pennsylvania, have 
more effectively restructured their markets to allow for competition and to maintain 
lower prices (EIA, 2000). Deregulation allowed independent companies to enter state 
markets and hold an increasing share of net generation. Investor owned utilities have 
divested an increasing number of generation assets and have increased merging activities 
as a result of deregulation. Deregulation also helped some new technologies, such as real-
time-pricing or bidirectional distribution automation, gain attention (Lovins et al., 2002). 
Deregulation trends have also raised important questions about the interaction between 
the electric industry and the environment (see Palmer, 1997; Sanyal, 2007, for example): 
will a competitive market be better for the environment; will utilities and independent 
power producers have an incentive to promote renewable energy; will market reforms 
encourage greater deployment of low-carbon distributed generation systems?  
Unruh’s account of carbon lock-in was published in 2000, following the historical 
foundations of the industry reviewed thus far. By the end of the 20th century, the electric 
industry in the U.S. still relied primarily on fossil fuel generation to satisfy electricity 
demands, with guiding market objectives to keep electricity costs low and reliability high. 
These new changes in the sector’s structure represent a fairly significant shift from past 
trends, but do not necessarily challenge carbon lock-in, or the feedbacks between the 
technical and institutional components of the industry. 
 
5. A Review of Industry Drivers  
The history reviewed thus far captures the process—technological and 
institutional feedbacks—that the U.S. electricity sector experienced, the result of which is 
the quasi-equilibrium state of carbon lock-in, as it existed up through the twentieth 
century. In review of this history, it is evident that no single element solely shaped the 
structural and institutional changes within the electricity sector, and gradual transition 
toward carbon lock-in, through the decades. Instead, several factors shaped the structure 
of the industry through the years, including firm, market, consumer, and governmental 
factors. These factors collectively led the electricity sector toward a quasi-equilibrium 
state, in which generation and consumption operations were driven substantially by fossil 
fuel-based, carbon-intensive energy technologies. 
At the firm level, technological drivers significantly shaped developments within 
the sector since its inception. From the advent of AC-DC converters and electric 
motors—through large-scale hydroelectric projects, coal combustion technologies, 
advances in thermal efficiency, transmission and distribution infrastructural 
                                                 
7 The general restructured model maintains regulation of transmission and distribution operations but turns 
the generation side over to a competitive market. 
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improvements, and nuclear fission technologies—technological developments made 
centralized fossil fueled power the most economically-efficient form of operation. When 
efficiency gains in thermal technologies leveled off in the mid- to late-‘60s the industry 
invested more heavily in nuclear technologies; and when the efficiency of natural gas 
generators increased in the 1980s the industry built natural gas and combined cycle 
systems at a rapid rate. Throughout this entire history, firm investments in technology 
have been based on economies of scale; and these investments have favored consistently 
large-scale power plant operations that tend to use fossil fuel as a primary energy source.  
At the market level, dating back to Samuel Insull, who effectively convinced both 
public and private industry leaders to adopt a regulated market model, industry leaders 
have exerted significant influence over promoting or impeding change within the 
electricity sector. Under a regulated electricity market, private natural monopolies are 
granted exclusive market power, though state and federal governmental institutions 
heavily regulate their practices. Utilities have reaffirmed this market power by working to 
keep production costs low, securing exclusive service territories, providing reliable 
service, controlling transmission and distribution infrastructure, and lobbying at the state 
and federal level to protect their interests. Private companies have also maintained 
control within the market by facilitating partnerships, mergers, acquisitions, and power 
pools in response to market opportunities and changes. 
Government intervention has also shaped the structure of the industry. 
Throughout most of the sector’s history, government intervention has been reactive, 
primarily aimed at checking market power. These trends are evident in the reforms made 
in the Progressive era to establish explicit government regulation, in New Deal PUHCA 
and REA legislation, and in various forms of legislation that emerged in the 1970s, 
including the Clean Air Act of 1970 and the formation of NEPA. These policies and 
regulations shaped the institutional structure of the industry, and supported, if not 
dictated, the industry’s quest for the lowest cost, most reliable, and highest quality energy 
services. Starting around the mid-70s, direct government intervention within the sector 
became more proactive, with a few exceptions due to “pendulum politics” (Andrews, 
1999). Starting with PURPA in 1978 and continuing with DSM and IRP regulations in 
the ‘80s, government involvement in the industry has been less focused on restricting 
market forces or reacting to circumstances of market power. Instead, government 
involvement has been geared toward transforming the industry by facilitating 
opportunities for technological innovation and open market entrance. These more recent 
policy and governance developments, however, have not altered significantly the 
feedback between institutional and technological forces within the industry, nor led the 
industry to stray from operations that continually support carbon-intensive generation 
sources.  
Consumer level factors that have shaped the operations of the industry include 
both advocacy work and behavioral responses. Consumers responded to cheap electricity 
rates and rapidly expanding energy supplies—sourced primarily from fossil fuels—in the 
post-WWII era by increasing energy demand and adopting energy-intensive behavioral 
patterns. Consumer demand for cheaper rates and environmental responsibility 
encouraged government regulation in the 1970s and again in the 1990s. The greater 
public’s involvement in the environmental movement of the 1970s helped encourage the 
adoption of PURPA and promotion of energy efficiency programs. Citizens’ protests over 
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rising electricity rates, as well as a growing interest in electricity market competition by 
leading think tanks and other researchers, spurred a movement in the industry toward 
deregulation in the 1990s. Falling energy prices and a consequential reduced consumer 
interest in conservation efforts in the late 1980s, on the other hand, impaired the 
effectiveness of DSM and IRP programs. 
This complex combination of institutional actors and drivers fundamentally 
shaped the structure of the electricity sector through the end of the twentieth century. As I 
examine current events within the sector and consider possibilities for a break from 
carbon lock-in, I return to these defining factors to gather deeper insights about new 
developments and their future ramifications.  
 
6. Electricity in the 21st Century 
6.1 New Trends in the Electric Industry 
One of the most prominent developments within the electric sector since the 
beginning of deregulation has been the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which, on the whole, 
produced only nominal effects on the structure and scale of the electric industry. The 
Energy Policy Act was enacted by the 109th Congress after four years of congressional 
deliberation, and signed into law by President George W. Bush in August, 2005. The 
adoption process made evident that energy policy had, through the years, become a 
partisan, as well as regional, issue. Energy policy had come to involve diverse 
stakeholders and different market actors with conflicting interests, multiple levels of 
government involvement and regulations, and intricate connections to environmental and 
economic development.  
The 2005 energy bill extended the federal production tax credit for wind and 
biomass, and also extended additional tax credits to other forms of renewable energy 
development. However, it failed to adopt a national renewable electricity standard or 
address global warming through regulation, and also repealed PUHCA. The bill primarily 
supported fossil fuel generation and expansion, with a disproportionate amount of 
funding allocated to nuclear, coal, oil, and gas (UCS, 2005). The Union of Concerned 
Scientists (2005) estimated that out of the total $14.5 billion tax provisions within the 
bill, 39 percent of the tax package funds went to nuclear, 31 percent went to fossil fuels, 
and 9 percent went toward renewable energy development and deployment. The 
remaining 21 percent went elsewhere, the majority of which toward energy efficiency. 
 Other electricity sector developments in the early twenty-first century have been 
less pronounced but potentially more formative for the long-term structure of the 
industry. These events include the overlap of electricity and environmental policy 
through public discussions of global climate change, the emergence of state government 
leadership in progressive energy policy, and the rise of renewable energy as a viable 
source of energy supply.  
In the early 2000s the industry experienced a resurgence of attention devoted to 
the environment, reminiscent in part of the 1970s, but this time due to global discussions 
of climate change. Climate change discussions emerged in the early 1990s, when the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) published their first Assessment 
Report (Patterson, 1999). Discussions of climate change, and the potential for a 
coordinated, global effort to mitigate its effects, increased throughout the 1990s. 
Eventually the causal link between electricity emissions and climate change, and also 
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between climate change and environmental and human health in turn, became widely 
regarded, though not universally accepted, as fact. The recognition of this connection has 
led many industry leaders and government bodies to consider seriously the scope and 
scale of traditional electricity operations. While no federal regulatory measures that aim 
to restrict carbon emissions have been adopted in the U.S. thus far, and while few utility 
companies have independently sought to devise energy portfolios based on carbon-
neutrality, several disconnected efforts have been made to address the connection 
between climate change and electricity production. 
The majority of these efforts are based at the state level. Many state governments 
across the country have begun to implement policy incentives and regulatory measures 
that aim to increase low- or no-carbon energy technologies, expand energy efficiency 
programs, reduce carbon emissions that come from electric generation, and provide 
incentives for consumers to purchase distributed generation systems. Many states have 
adopted renewable portfolio standards (RPS) and energy efficiency resource standards 
(EERS) to increase the percentage, and total amount, of renewable energy and energy 
efficiency, respectively, in state’s generation portfolios.  As of 2010, 45 states have either 
a mandatory or voluntary RPS policy; 24 states have some type of an EERS policy, either 
mandatory or voluntary, and connected to RPS legislation or as stand-alone legislation 
(NC Solar Center, 2010). Studies have found that these policies have thus far effectively 
increased total wind energy development and deployment (Langniss and Wiser, 2003; 
Menz and Vachon, 2006; Carley, 2009), although the effect of these policy instruments 
on the percentage of renewable energy out of total generation was, as of 2006, still 
relatively insignificant (Carley, 2009). The majority of states have also enacted net 
metering and interconnection standards in attempt to facilitate relationships between 
utilities and independent electricity power producers and end-use customers that would 
like to invest in distributed generation. Additional grants, loans, rebates, buy-back 
incentives, and tax incentives offered by different states provide further incentives for the 
deployment of both small-scale and large-scale renewable electricity systems, as owned 
by the end-use consumer. Equipment efficiency standards, as well as building codes, also 
aim to increase energy efficiency and end-user electricity savings. 
Over the last decade, many private utilities and independent companies across the 
country have initiated green marketing programs. These programs represent an attempt 
on behalf of utilities and not-for-profits to respond to consumer advocacy for greater 
renewable energy deployment. Green power programs allow consumers to pay an extra 
premium on top of their regular electricity bill for shares of renewable energy. This 
premium is designed to cover the extra cost of renewables, which displaces a portion of 
the dispatched fossil fuel power with renewable power. As several studies conclude, 
consumers have expressed consistently a willingness to pay more for clean energy, but as 
of 2004 green pricing programs had very low participation rates of roughly one to two 
percent on average (Swezey and Bird, 2001; Wiser et al., 2001; Wiser et al., 2004). These 
rates are, however, rising (Bird et al., 2008), as consumers grow more aware of and 
concerned about climate change, and as more utilities choose to offer green marketing 
options. As of 2008, approximately 983,000 customers, including both residential and 
non-residential, participated in green marketing programs (EIA, 2010b). 
The U.S. electricity sector, in its current form, is still heavily dominated by 
centralized fossil fuel power production, owned and operated predominantly by a select 
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group of private industry leaders. In the year 2009, the electric industry built the largest 
amount of new operational coal capacity, for a total of 3,218 MW, since 1991 (Shuster, 
2010). As of this same year, 44.6 percent of the total electric generation in the U.S. came 
from coal, 20.2 percent from nuclear, 23.3 percent from natural gas, 6.9 percent from 
hydroelectricity, 3.6 from percent renewables, and 1.0 from percent petroleum (EIA, 
2010). Graph 1, below, demonstrates the mix of electricity generation sources, by 
percentage, as of 2009. Graph 2 demonstrates trends in U.S. electricity generation sources 
over time. Over the past decade, from 1997 to 2007, hydropower has declined from 10.2 
to 6.9 percent of the total generation and coal has declined from 52.8 to 44.6 percent. 
Renewable energy generation has increased by more than one percent, from 2.2 to 3.6 
percent; while natural gas has increased by roughly 10 percent (EIA, 2010). As these 
graphs reveal, U.S. generation is still primarily reliant on fossil fuel resources, although 
renewable energy has, particularly in recent years, started to capture a greater market 
share of the electric generation market. 
 
Graph 1. Percentage Electricity Generation by Energy Source, 2009 
 
Source of data: EIA, 2010 
 
Graph 2. Total Generation by Energy Source (in Thousand MWh), 1996-2009 
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Source of data: EIA, 2010 
 
 Several trends, however, reveal that coal generation is diminishing in market size. 
As Graph 2 demonstrates, the percentage of coal out of the total generation has 
diminished over time. Graph 3, below, also reveals that coal production in the U.S. has 
leveled off and remained relatively flat since the late 1990s. In addition, a significant 
number of proposed coal generation plants proposed as of 2000 have been canceled; out 
of the original 36,000 MW the industry announced in 2000 that it planned to build, only 
4,500 MW of capacity was built by 2007 (Shuster, 2010). Also, even though the year 
2009 witnessed the largest increase in new operational coal capacity since 1991, planned 
coal builds took a sharp dive: out of a total of 19,520 MW of utility planned coal 
capacity, 4,605 MW (23.6 percent) was formally proposed and 14,915 MW (76.4 
percent) was canceled (Shuster, 2010).  
 
Graph 3. U.S. Coal Production in Million Short Tons, 1950-2003 
 
Source: EIA, 2006 
 
Other trends indicate that the electricity sector may be moving toward greater use 
of renewable energy, an integration of smaller power systems with more traditional 
centralized units, more diverse technologies, and enhanced market competition. Wind 
energy development and deployment in the U.S., for instance, has increased significantly 
since the turn of the century; some authors contend that state energy policies played a 
significant role in driving this development over the past several years (Wiser and 
Bolinger, 2010). The average annual growth rate in wind development between 2005 and 
2009 was 39 percent; and, as of the end of 2009, total wind capacity was over 35,000 
MW (AWEA, 2010), up from 1,695 MW of capacity in 1999 (AWEA, 2002). The 
American Wind Energy Association (2010) reports that over 90 percent of all new 
capacity added since 2005 is either wind or natural gas. Wind capacity also accounts for 
roughly 64 percent of new planned capacity in 2010 and 59 percent in 2011 (Shuster, 
2010). As of 2009, four states produced more than ten percent of total electricity 
generation from wind: Iowa (19.7%), South Dakota (13.3%), North Dakota (11.9%), and 
Minnesota (10.7%) (Wiser and Bolinger, 2010). 
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The electricity sector of the twenty-first century has not only diversified fuel 
sources, it has also diversified primary market actors and traditional market relationships. 
In the 1990s and 2000s there has been a large increase in the number of independent, 
non-utility power producers. Between 1996 and 2007, independent power producers 
increased the percentage of total market generation that they provided from 6.3 to 38.5 
percent; during this same period, independent power producers expanded the share that 
they provided of non-hydroelectric renewable generation from 83.7 percent to 87.4 
percent (EIA, 2010b; this share reached as high as 96.1 percent in 2001). Simultaneously, 
mergers and acquisitions between private utility companies have increased (Byrne and 
Mun, 2003) and utilities have expanded to fill regional and international markets 
(Patterson, 1999). Regional partnerships between private utilities as well as independent 
power producers and non-profit organizations have increased. 
The use of small-scale energy systems, owned by both utilities and end-use 
customers, has increased as well. The capacity of dispersed generation—distributed 
generation units that are not connected to the electrical grid—grew from roughly 4,000 
MW to 9,700 MW between 2004 and 2008 (EIA, 2008). Distributed generation capacity 
grew from 5,400 to 12,900 MW in these same years. The number of customers that 
participate in net metering programs has also increased; between 2004 and 2008, net 
metering customers increased from approximately 15,800 to 70,000 (EIA, 2010b).8 
Utility-sponsored DSM programs have increased spending levels by an average of 
9.2 percent annually since 1997 and, as a result, increased electricity savings by an 
annual average of 32.9 percent (EIA, 2010b). Utility energy efficiency programs 
achieved energy efficiency savings of approximately 86,000 thousand MWh in 2008 (2 
percent of total generation), up from 13,300 thousand MWh in 1997 (.4 percent of total 
generation). Electricity savings due to utility load management programs also increased, 
albeit to a lesser degree, from 12,000 MW in 1997 to 13,000 MW in 2008 (EIA, 2010b).  
Non-utility energy efficiency and load leveling programs have also gained 
momentum in recent years. Government purchasing programs for energy efficiency, for 
instance, have also led to substantial electricity savings and load shifting or shaving over 
the past decade; potential cost savings from these efforts are measured by the Consortium 
for Energy Efficiency as approximately one billion dollars per year across all levels of 
government (Harris et al., 2004). Energy efficiency service sectors, which includes a 
variety of occupations involved in the deployment and installation of energy efficiency 
products and services, are predicted to expand employment from approximately 114,000 
person-years of employment (includes roughly 370,000 individuals ) in 2008 to 400,000 
person-years of employment in 2020 (includes 1.3 million individuals) in 2020 (Goldman 
et al., 2010). 
 
6.2 Escaping Lock-in? 
A consideration of trends within the electricity sector over the past decade to two 
reveals a series of gradual changes, resulting in somewhat conflicting movements. On the 
one hand, the industry has experienced a flurry of activity focused on opening markets to 
competition. Some states have deregulated their electricity markets entirely and others 
have implemented partial restructuring plans. Even in regulated states, certain aspects of 
                                                 
8 The EIA began collecting distributed generation, dispersed generation, and net metering data in form 
EIA-861 in 2004. 
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the market are becoming more competitive, such as the sub-markets for ancillary services 
or wholesale power markets. Utilities are continually expanding their services to capture 
new niches within these changing markets. The entrepreneurial spirit has not only 
affected standard utility operations, but it has also led to the significant increase of 
independent power producers in electricity markets. To adapt to these changes within the 
market, utilities have formed power pools and trans-regional partnerships. These changes 
also account for the increasing number of mergers and acquisitions, and the overall 
concentration of market power in the hands of the few with the remaining power spread 
among a large number of diverse actors. In short, the electricity sector is growing more 
regional, and even international, in scale. Notions of competition fuel this expansion; 
while this expansion simultaneously encourages greater competition.  
On the other hand, the electricity sector is relying on more renewable energy and 
energy efficiency resources and, to some degree, becoming smaller in scale. New base 
load power plants are smaller and more efficient than they used to be. Power operations 
from natural gas, the most efficient and least harmful to the environment of all fossil 
fuels, have steadily increased over the past five years. Wind energy capacity has grown at 
an extraordinary rate, although from a small base. Distributed and dispersed generation 
capacity has also grown in recent years (EIA, 2008). And utility-sponsored DSM 
programs have increased spending levels, end-user savings, and electric load savings. The 
industry has devoted increasing attention to renewable energy deployment, energy 
efficiency and conservation programs, state-led energy initiatives, and industrial and 
commercial adoption of combined heat and power and distributed generation units.   
These two industry trends are inter-related, and are both driven by a combination 
of the electricity drivers examined above, including firm, market, consumer, and 
government level interactions. I focus my discussion on the movement toward less 
carbon-intensive and smaller-scale energy resources, since this trend is most directly 
related to Unruh’s theory of carbon lock-in and may in fact represent a viable “escape” 
path away from lock-in; but I return to the interactions between the two movements 
below. 
At the firm level, technological drivers have led the industry toward smaller-scale 
and more efficient power systems. Efficiency improvements in natural gas systems, 
distributed and dispersed generation units, fuel cells, and wind turbines have made 
smaller systems more competitive with centralized power. End-users and independent 
power producers are now able to own and operate their own power units and do so cost-
efficiently (for more information on cost comparisons, see Budhraja, 1999). 
At the market level, industry leadership has changed as a result of greater market 
competition. While a small number of IOUs control a significant portion of the market, a 
large number of other utility and non-utility entities exert influence as well. Independent 
power producers, for instance, have taken advantage of the opportunities offered by 
PURPA and Orders 888 and 889 by investing in non-traditional electricity sources and 
vying for market share. Independent power producer investments in renewable energy 
and distributed generation operations has helped reduce the premiums associated with 
these technologies, thereby making them more cost-competitive with traditional 
electricity sources.  
At the intersection of the market and firm levels, some of the industry’s largest 
IOUs have also contributed to changes in the market toward less carbon-intensive and 
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smaller operations. Because large IOUs often cross state boundaries, any given company 
may face several state regulations at once, depending on the location of their service 
territories. For instance, one company may be required to comply with a 12.5 percent 
RPS goal in one state, a 20 percent goal and a net metering program in another state, and 
no RPS goals but an advanced IRP program in a third. Concerned about inconsistent state 
regulations such as these, some IOUs, though not the majority, are beginning to advocate 
for uniform regulations toward renewable energy and energy efficiency (see, for instance, 
Duke Energy’s 2010 Sustainability Report (Duke Energy, 2010)). It will be less 
expensive, these companies argue, to gradually reduce their carbon footprints today, 
rather than make drastic measures to cut emissions tomorrow. Uniform standards would 
hold all IOUs to the same obligations, which would remove any disadvantages that 
currently accrue to utilities who operate in states with stricter RPS or other policy 
standards. National carbon standards would also help ensure a stable investment 
environment for alternative energy resources (Investment Summit on Climate Change, 
2010). 
At the government level, public involvement in the electricity sector is 
concentrated primarily at the state level. State governments have proactively taken the 
lead in energy policy. Each state has adopted a unique combination of policy incentives, 
regulatory measures, and voluntary initiatives that aim to diversify their electricity 
sectors, increase the amount of generation that comes from renewable energy, or decrease 
the carbon emissions that come from electricity generation. These state policies have 
shaped the direction of the industry significantly over the past decade. Even if the short-
run magnitude of effect on renewable energy deployment or energy efficiency 
developments is small, the mere adoption of these policies sends a signal to utility 
companies that sustainability—and, in particular, lower carbon-intensity generation—
must play a larger role in the long-run structure of the industry (Rader and Norgaard, 
1996), and a signal to consumers that electricity consumption is an issue that merits 
personal consideration in behavioral habits.  
State-level participation in energy policy has initiated policy momentum at the 
state level. Whereas only Nevada and Iowa had RPS policies in 1997, ten states had an 
RPS policy by 2002, and 45 states had one by 2010 (NC Solar Center, 2010). Similar 
trends are noticeable for other policies as well, such as energy efficiency portfolio 
standards, tax incentives, net metering programs, and various subsidy programs. Policy 
diffusion has not only encouraged states to adopt policies that they may not have 
otherwise, it has also led to a steady increase in benchmark goals and other restrictions or 
incentives. For instance, states frequently revise their RPS design features to include 
higher renewable energy goals that are more commensurate with other states’ 
benchmarks.9  
                                                 
9 It is worth taking a moment to consider why state governments have initiated policy developments in the 
electricity sector. Some argue that states’ activity in this realm is due to their desire to lead by example, and 
to demonstrate proactive leadership and public concern in absence of federal responsibility for energy or 
climate policy. Others would contend, however, that state leadership is also due to an expectation that has 
grown over the past decade of the business and economic development opportunities inherent in alternative 
energy developments (Rabe, 2004). Furthermore, some states actors have come to believe that energy 
efficiency, and possibly even renewable energy, could potentially generate more in-state economic benefits 
than paying rising energy costs for state or nationally imported fuels.  
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The combination of increasingly proactive state energy policies and the regional 
growth of the electricity sector has generated a new variant of government involvement 
in the electric industry. This government involvement is geared toward carbon mitigation 
and has most recently burgeoned into the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). 
RGGI is a regional carbon cap-and-trade partnership among ten Northeast and Mid-
Atlantic states. RGGI is an illustration of the type of innovative state policy initiative that 
has become increasingly prevalent over the past decade, but also relies on the benefits of 
regional partnerships and the flexibility of a market-based policy instrument design. 
Since the initial RGGI discussions, several other regional partnerships have formed. The 
Western Climate Initiative, for instance, which includes seven U.S. states and four 
Canadian provinces, is scheduled to begin a cap-and-trade program on January 1, 2012 
(Pew Center for Global Climate Change, 2010). The Midwest Greenhouse Gas Reduction 
Accord, signed in 2007, includes six states and one Canadian province. All Accord 
participants agree to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions via reduction targets, and 
commit to participation in an emissions tracking system (Pew Center for Global Climate 
Change, 2010).  
The final driver of recent trends includes developments at the consumer level. 
Throughout the 1990s, electricity consumers were concerned primarily with the 
reliability of their electricity service, mainly as a result of the rolling blackouts in 
California and elsewhere. These concerns have encouraged a number of changes in the 
industry:  technological improvements in transmission and distribution; the formation of 
independent system operators (ISOs) and regional transmission organizations (RTOs); an 
increase in the number of natural gas facilities to manage intermediate and peaking power 
loads; and the adoption of distributed generation units by commercial and industrial users 
to serve their own electricity needs. Throughout this same period and into the twenty-first 
century, a united or universal citizen movement did not support environmental concerns. 
Environmental coalitions were largely fractured among shorter-term issues, such as 
drilling for oil in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and campaigning for effective 
Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards, among others. This may perhaps explain 
why green marketing participation is low, despite survey results that indicate that 
consumers are willing to pay more for renewable energy.  
More recently, however, several events have shed light on the “problem stream” 
(Kingdon, 1995) of global climate change. Former Vice-President Al Gore’s 2006 
documentary, An Inconvenient Truth, framed the issues behind climate change. Just as 
citizens were able to attach real images to problems of pollution in the 1960s and 1970s 
(Andrews, 2006), Gore’s documentary evoked viewers’ love of living creatures and awe 
for natural beauty, and effectively attached this pathos to a general concern about global 
warming. Concurrently, the IPCC has released their second, third, and fourth assessment 
reports on climate change (most recently in 2007), which reaffirm the scientific evidence 
behind climate change. These events have gone a long way to build citizens’ 
understanding of the overlap between electricity and climate change. It is still too early to 
tell, however, whether an understanding of these issues will develop into an active citizen 
involvement in energy and climate change, or whether citizens will be able to maintain 
their focus on energy and climate when also conflicted over issues related to the economy 
and health care.  
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Returning to the original research question, is the U.S. electricity sector on the 
path to escaping carbon lock-in? In consideration of some basic generation statistics, as 
reviewed above, it is evident that the U.S. electricity sector in its current form still relies 
more heavily upon carbon-emitting fossil fuels in large-scale, centralized power 
applications than alternative sources of generation. Renewable energy makes up a small 
fraction of annual electricity capacity. Distributed generation deployment rates are 
growing but still relatively low. Energy efficiency programs have demonstrated some 
reductions in peak demand and consumer energy savings but have yet to realize 
substantial savings as a percentage of total generation.  
Yet several recent trends and other data indicate that the industry is actually 
growing less carbon-intensive and smaller in energy system size, and likely becoming 
more sustainable in operations. Crucial drivers—firm level responses to technological 
change, private company leadership at the market level, government intervention and 
policy momentum, and citizen involvement—that have traditionally shaped the structure, 
scale, and environmental footprint of the industry, have begun to reveal signs of change, 
and a divergence from the techno-institutional complex that has characterized the 
industry for the past 70, plus or minus, years. Technological improvements are pushing 
firms to invest in smaller and more efficient energy systems, as well as “smart-grid” and 
real-time-pricing capabilities to manage diverse electric loads. Private company 
leadership is driving the market toward greater market competition, regional-scale 
operations, and uniform environmental and energy-supply standards. Government 
intervention is focusing on opening markets for renewable energy competitors, 
encouraging and mandating energy efficiency, and crafting carbon-reduction 
partnerships. Policy momentum has led to an increase in state and regional energy policy 
incentives, and the widespread use of regulatory measures that aim to reduce market 
barriers to renewable energy, energy efficiency, and distributed generation deployment. 
Finally, citizens’ insistence on electric reliability has indirectly promoted distributed 
generation deployment. Citizen involvement in the sector, furthermore, has recently 
begun to unify behind issues of climate change. If citizen involvement continues to 
increase in this capacity, citizens may effectively generate a political stream, which 
would likely compliment the state-initiated “policy stream” and the global warming 
“problem stream” (Kingdon, 1995). Trends indicate that a “policy window” for the 
development and deployment of advanced, efficient, and low- to no-carbon technologies 
may soon open. 
A complete escape from carbon lock-in is not yet definitive. There are several 
indications, however, that the industry is on route to an escape from its quasi-equilibrium 
state through changes in energy technologies and the institutions that operate and manage 
the U.S. electricity system. In contrast to Unruh’s theory (2002), which is upheld by 
others as well (March and Olsen, 1989; North, 1990; Cowan and Hultan, 1996), the 
findings of the present analysis reveal that an escape from lock-in may not require a 
“triggering” or “extraordinary” event. Instead, institutional changes can occur through the 
same processes that first established the equilibrium in the first place—processes that 
involve the firm, market, consumer, and government levels of the industry. These 
findings are not, however, in complete contrast to Unruh’s theories on escaping carbon 
lock-in. Indeed, each of the three mechanisms for escaping lock-in that Unruh presents 
are identifiable in the historical analysis presented above: the use of policy instruments to 
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encourage development and deployment of alternative energy technologies; the diffusion 
of information to facilitate public awareness about energy and climate issues; and the 
presence of some “focusing” events—which I emphasize is different than “triggering” or 
“extraordinary” events—to shed light on the potential long-term problems associated 
with the current structure and operations of the industry.  
In consideration of the future of the U.S. electric industry, as argued above, this 
analysis concludes that there two major movements that currently dominate the industry: 
regional growth fueled by increased competition; and a decrease in the size and carbon 
intensity of average generating facilities. It will be essential to observe how these 
movements interact in the future. If they coordinate efforts and build integrated 
objectives, development within the industry may encourage a complete break from 
carbon lock-in. Coordination between the movements may effectively break down 
traditional market barriers, build regional and even international partnerships between 
involved stakeholders, and make non-traditional electricity sources more cost-
competitive. If, instead, these trends compete for institutional resources and additionally 
fracture stakeholder commitment to change, the industry may struggle to maintain 
momentum toward the escape of carbon lock-in. These developments, however, still 
remain to be seen.  
What will be particularly crucial to observe is whether these industry trends, are 
they to eventually result in a complete break from lock-in and the rejection of the U.S.’s 
fossil fuel economy, occur within a time frame that is at all commensurate with climate 
changes. Can a complete escape transpire before any significant climate disturbances 
occur? The industry may eventually need to make trade-offs between mitigation and 
adaptation, since the dual rates of change of the U.S. electricity system and the global 
climate system are both unfolding. 
 
7. Conclusion 
The present study sought to answer the research question of whether the U.S. 
electricity sector is on a path to escaping carbon lock-in and which factors are 
contributing, or have potential to contribute, to a possible escape? In addressing this 
question, I reviewed the history of the electricity sector from its foundations in the late 
nineteenth century to its advanced, quasi-equilibrium state at the end of the twentieth 
century, which was marked by a heavy reliance on centralized, fossil fuel-intensive 
electricity generation and consumption. I then identified which factors contributed most 
significantly to the formation of the state of carbon lock-in, and assessed the extent to 
which these same factors have recently contributed to a series of changes in the electricity 
sector. 
These trends collectively reveal that the industry may in fact be on route toward 
escaping lock-in, although a definitive escape has not yet occurred. An escape, 
furthermore, may not require triggering or extraordinary events, but instead has the 
potential to occur via the same mechanisms and type of technological-institutional 
interactions that led to lock-in in the first place. The timeline for escape is not yet set, 
however, which leaves the lingering question, can the U.S. electricity sector break from 
its carbon-intensive quasi-equilibrium before any significant climate disturbances occur? 
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